All politics is local, as they say. And so, before we proceed to the big question of this essay—Can modernity survive for much longer?—I want to start with a small one: Will the recent change of government make a difference to the people of Britain?
The recently departed Conservative government was sunk partly by a set of challenges that will be familiar to anyone in a high-income country—or, increasingly, a middle-income one. To start with, taxes are the highest they’ve been in generations, and yet the Conservatives felt compelled to keep funneling money towards health (20 percent of public spending) and pensions (10 percent of public spending) because both kinds of spending benefit their most reliable voting bloc. The Labour Party, in winning power, made exactly the same promises, and for exactly the same reason: the grey vote. This means that spending is not going to fall and neither will taxes, the under-housed and over-taxed young be damned.
Meanwhile, discontent over immigration policy was the key driver of the violent unrest this summer. Along with almost every other high-income Western country, Britain is experiencing mass immigration against the wishes of the majority of its voters. Having taken the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum literally rather than seriously, the government has stopped the flow of migrants from Eastern Europe and replaced it with a much larger flow of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian subcontinent. A country that was 99.9 percent white in 1951 is projected to become minority-autochthonous at some point before the end of this century.
This process has been represented by the British government as a natural phenomenon, as inevitable as weather. Other governments have adopted the same tone. “Over the past few years we’ve seen a massive spike in temporary immigration,” said Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in April of this year, carefully understating both the likely permanence of this demographic change and his own culpability (his government has “seen” these changes, rather than engineered them). Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, described as “far-right” by her critics, has thus far failed to deliver on her promise to reduce immigration. And even Japan, which has historically been alone among high-income countries in keeping immigration levels extremely low, is loosening its border restrictions.
Either there is a conspiracy at play, or—more likely—something much bigger and more ominous is going on. Britain may have pursued mass migration more intensively than most other countries, but a larger pattern is evident worldwide: The flow of people from the poor world to the rich world in the twenty-first century is as strong, and as historically significant, as the flow of people from the Old World to the New once was.
The governments permitting this flow have made an economic pact with their voters: You may not like mass immigration, but the payoff is lower taxes and higher-quality public services. It’s inevitable anyway, so there’s no point complaining.
And yet it is increasingly apparent that this pact is not being honored. At the time of writing, Britain is in recession, after fifteen years of stagnant growth: a stagnation which has coincided with a historically unprecedented surge in immigration. Britain’s miserable economic prospects are not unique among its peers. Earlier this year, The Economist published a report that analyzed data from thirty-five rich countries. “Whereas in 2017-19 the median country in our sample ran a budget surplus,” wrote the report’s authors, “last year it ran a budget deficit of close to 2.5% of GDP.” The story is the same across all of these countries: weak tax receipts combined with profligate state spending. “How long can the firehose keep blasting?” The Economist asks of these outflows, which are particularly directed towards health and welfare. Now there’s a big question.
I listen to the tentative optimism of my British friends and family, all hoping that our current problems are set to be remedied, at least partially, by our brand-new government. I cannot agree with them, and not only because I take a dim view of the Labour Party leadership. I am pessimistic because I believe that our various problems are in fact just one problem, and it’s a problem that no one—certainly not the British Labour Party—knows how to solve.
Put bluntly: The people on whom modernity depends are failing to reproduce themselves, which means that modernity itself is failing to reproduce itself. Most voters have no idea that this is happening. Nor do most politicians. But it is happening nonetheless, and we are experiencing its early stages in the form of diverse political crises across the modern world.
Does anyone also feel that ‘grand-childlessness’ is an under talked aspect of the birth rate problem? I know an elderly woman who’s a little heartbroken that her kids (all in their late 40s) never had children and that she never got to be a grandmother.
For the last 300 years humanity has effectively been doing a million meter sprint in terms of technologically innovating without ever taking a breath. An individual human needs to take a breath after a long sprint so why wouldn’t human civilisation as a whole?
In some ways I think the fertility crisis is gonna be that breath that humanity takes since it’ll hamper technological advancement for quite a while. We’ve been ‘progress-maxing’ for about 300 years will little time to adapt to changes.
In some ways I think technology innovating too fast like it is now is actually anti-natalist in the sense that it causes too much of a generation gap in the utility of life wisdom. Right now, Gen X parents have nothing to say to their Gen Z kids in terms of advice regarding navigating the new digital world because it came to be so fast, leaving Gen X’s life experiences and life advice useless and redundant to tell to their kids outside of basics.
I think there’s an optimal rate of technological change that is pro-natalist but that’s not what we have now. Our rate of technological progress is too fast and as a result it makes people become too obsolete too quickly and far harder for different generations to connect to each other, leading to lots of inter generational resentment. I don’t think it’s a surprise millennials/Gen Z have such contempt for baby boomers when they effectively grew up in two different universes and Boomer life advice is completely obsolete to them which from the perspective of millennial kids make their boomer parents seem insensitive and for boomer parents it makes them think their millennial kids are ungrateful. And both are kind of right about each other in a way. It’s impossible for the boomers to NOT come off as insensitive when they’ll never understand growing up with the internet and its impossible for millennials to not come off as ungrateful when they can’t accept that their boomer parents genuinely don’t know what they’re doing wrong because well…they’re boomers.
As a Gen Z young man, I actually feel the inter generational resentment younger generations of the future will have for us will be far greater than the generational resentment we have against boomers due to the fertility crisis and this will put us in a bad spot since it’ll be happening as we grow old. Ironically we could end up being seen exactly like the boomers. The whole ‘zoomer’ synonym makes a lot more sense now.
In the past childless people had connections to younger generations through their sibling’s children in the form of their nephews and nieces. But in the 21st century if you have a family of three kids and all become childless, first that bloodline is ended but second, they’ll have no connection to the next generations of kids.
Anyway, happy to see in you post more frequently Louise again. Will we go back to 2 podcast episodes per week again soon?